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Even though there is ample evidence that planning future actions plays a role in attentional 
processing (e.g., Downing, 2000; Soto et al., 2008), it is not clear to what extent planning in itself 
(rather than the prior experience of the planned actions) controls attention. We suggest that 
attention can be biased towards stimuli that are associated with instructions for tasks that will be 
performed in the future even if those tasks have not yet been experienced. We performed two 
experiments in which participants receive instructions in which some objects were associated with a 
response (i.e., instructed S-R objects; Experiment 1) or a stimulus property (i.e., instructed S-S 
objects; Experiment 2) whereas control objects were not. However, before participants were 
required to perform the S-R task (Experiment 1) or perform an S-S memory task (Experiment 2), they 
performed a visual probe task in which target objects and control objects served as irrelevant cues. 
Our results show that attention was biased towards the S-R objects (compared to control stimuli) but 
not to S-S objects. These findings suggest that future plans can bias attention toward specific stimuli, 
but only when these stimuli are associated with a specific action. We discuss these findings in light of 
research concerning automatic effects of instructions and theories that view attention as a selection-





It is common knowledge that attentional processing can be affected by recent experiences. 
For instance, the “priming of pop-out” effect (for a review, see Kristjansson & Campana, 2010) shows 
that visual search for a salient target is more efficient when the target’s salient feature (e.g., color) is 
repeated over trials (e.g., Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; for other ways in which selection history 
affects attentional processing, see Awh, Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). While consensus exists that 
attention can be modulated through experience, the extent to which future plans affect attention is 
less clear. A famous example that suggests that future plans affect attention is the contingent 
capture effect (e.g., Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1992), which shows that a salient distractor 
interferes with target processing more when this salient feature is shared with the expected target 
(i.e., both distractor and target are salient because of their color) than when it is not (i.e., the target 
is salient because of its color; the distractor is salient because it is characterized by a sudden onset). 
In other words, when participants keep a plan to respond to a future target in working memory, 
attention is biased toward related distractors. 
More recently, other studies have been performed with the aim of examining interactions 
between working memory and attention. These studies commonly consist of different tasks. First, a 
participant is asked to remember a certain stimulus. This is followed by an attention task in which 
this stimulus appears as an irrelevant feature. Finally, participants are asked to recall or recognize the 
to-be-remembered stimulus (for an overview, see Soto, Hodsoll, Rotshtein, & Humphreys, 2008). 
Commonly, the memory-task has an effect on attentional processing. In visual search tasks, reactions 
are faster when targets are presented within a to-be-remembered stimulus (e.g., Dowd & Mitroff, 
2013; Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006) and slower when the to-be-remembered stimulus is 
presented as a distractor (e.g., Soto & Humphreys, 2007;  Soto, Humphreys, & Heinke, 2006) or as a 
singleton distractor (e.g., Olivers, Meijer, & Theeuwes, 2006, but for some critical notes, see Downing 
& Dodds, 2004 and Woodman & Luck, 2007). Similarly, when a to-be-remembered item is used as a 
cue in a visual probe tasks (e.g., Downing, 2000; Schwark, Dolgov, Sandry, & Volkman, 2013) reaction 
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times are faster when a target is presented at the same location of a to-be-remembered cue than 
when it is presented at the opposite location.  
Importantly, because in most of these experiments, the to-be-remembered items in these 
experiments were irrelevant and uninformative in the attention tasks, these effects do not seem to 
be due to top-down attentional control. In addition, the stimuli that were held in working memory 
did not differ in visual salience from the other cues or distractors (with the exception of Olivers and 
colleagues, 2006) but nevertheless managed to capture attention.  
These findings suggest that bottom-up attentional effects can be modulated by one’s future 
plans (i.e., the plan to respond to a certain target). However, previous experiences are generally 
confounded with our plans for the future, both in real life as well as in the lab. This is also a very 
important limitation of the studies discussed above. For instance, in Folk et al.’s study, participants 
experienced targets and distractors during large numbers of trials, leading some to suggest that 
these effects are due to participants’ selection history instead of participants’ future plans 
(Belopolsky, Schreij, & Theeuwes, 2010; see also Awh et al., 2012). Similarly, participants in the visual 
search tasks (e.g., Olivers et al., 2006; Soto et al., 2006; Soto & Humphreys, 2007) had experience in 
both attending to the to-be-remembered color and in performing the memory task. In Downing’s 
study (2000), the to-be-remembered stimuli were novel in each trial, but still participants had ample 
of time to study these stimuli before the beginning of the trial. 
Because of this confound, the question whether future plans alone (i.e., without prior 
execution of the plans) can induce an early, automatic attentional bias remains unanswered. This is 
somewhat surprising because prominent theories of attention emphasize the role of attention in the 
planning of future actions (e.g., Allport, 1987; Treisman, 1996). Attention is often assumed to serve 
as a mechanism that selects relevant information from the enormous quantity of stimuli we 
encounter in our environment because our cognitive system is too limited to process all this 
information (e.g., Broadbent, 1958). However, Allport (1987) suggested that the selectivity might be 
necessary not because of our processing limitations, but because of the limited nature of our 
5 
 
capacities to act upon our environment. When participants plan to perform a specific action, it is 
beneficial if they are able to efficiently process information relevant for performing this action, and 
to ignore irrelevant information (for an overview see Hannus, Neggers, Cornelisen, & Bekkering, 
2004). In addition, “common coding” accounts suggest that action and perception share the same 
representational domain (e.g., Hommel, Müsseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001; Stoet & Hommel, 
2002). This implies that an action can prime a stimulus, and vice versa. More importantly, these 
theories also suggest that action planning will influence attentional processing of action-related 
stimuli (e.g., Fagioli, Ferlazzo, & Hommel, 2007; Fagioli, Hommel, & Schubotz, 2007). Although these 
theories assume a strong relationship between attention and action, the influence of planning a new 
action (i.e., without prior execution) on attentional processing remains unexplored.  
While the impact of future plans on attention remains to be determined, research on 
response-compatibility effects demonstrated that a plan about a future action or task that is merely 
based on the implementation of instructions can lead to automatic response activations (Cohen-
Kdoshay & Meiran, 2007; De Houwer, Beckers, Vandorpe & Custers, 2005; Everaert, Theeuwes, 
Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 2014; Liefooghe, De Houwer and Wenke, 2013; Liefooghe, Wenke, & De 
Houwer, 2012; Meiran & Cohen-Kdoshay, 2012; Meiran, Pereg, Kessler, Cole, & Braver, in press; 
Theeuwes, Liefooghe, & De Houwer, 2014; Waszak, Pfister, & Kiesel, 2013; Wenke, Gaschler, & 
Nattkemper, 2007; Wenke, De Houwer, De Winne, & Liefooghe, in press).  A common assumption in 
this line of research is that the cognitive system can prepare itself for a future task on the basis of 
instructions without any practice or experience (Meiran, Cole, & Brever, 2012). Such instruction-
based preparation leads to the formation of a functional plan in working memory, which guides 
performance when needed, but also biases performance when the plan is irrelevant.  
In a procedure that is highly relevant for our research, Liefooghe, et al. (2012, 2013) asked 
participants to perform two tasks. First, participants received instructions for an inducer task that 
consisted of pressing a specific button when a green letter appeared (e.g., if Q, press left; if P press 
right). Before performing this task, participants were asked to perform the diagnostic task, in which 
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they needed to decide whether letters were presented upright or in italic (e.g., press left for italics, 
press right for upright). After an unpredictable number of diagnostic test trials, the green inducer 
task probe appeared. Diagnostic trials were congruent when there was an overlap between 
responses in the inducer task (e.g., press left for a Q in italic) and incongruent when the opposite 
response was required in the inducer task (e.g., press right for an upright Q). The results showed that 
reaction times on congruent trials were faster than on incongruent trials, an effect they referred to 
as the instruction-based congruency effect (IBCE). 
It is important to note three striking features of this effect: first, none of the stimuli had 
specific salient features that made them stand out (i.e., bottom-up processes cannot account for 
these results). Second, it was not beneficial to the task to attend to specific letters in the diagnostic 
task, suggesting that top-down processes cannot account for these findings either. Third, new stimuli 
were used for each run, which means that the effect could not be driven by experience. In sum, the 
IBCE is due merely to planning a future action on the basis of instructions. Studies also showed that 
the formation of a functional plan seemed to be crucial for the IBCE to occur: when participants 
merely need to remember the instructions without performing the task, the IBCE disappeared. 
Finally, and of major interest for the present purposes, the IBCE is not restricted to situations in 
which the inducer and diagnostic task share the same responses. For instance, Wenke et al. (2007) 
did observe an IBCE between an inducer task, which instructed a left or right response to a letter-
stimulus, and a diagnostic task in which participants needed to judge the size of a stimulus. 
Importantly, in the diagnostic task, letter-stimuli from the inducer task were presented at either the 
left or the right side of fixation. Even though in this task both the identity of the stimulus as well as its 
location was irrelevant, they still affected behavior. This raises the question to what extent task-
irrelevant instructions bias earlier processing stages, such as attention. 
We used a variant of the procedure of Liefooghe et al. (2012) and the procedure of Downing 
(2000), in order to examine two research questions. First, we tested whether attention is biased 
toward new stimuli (S) that are paired with an instructed future response (R). On the basis of the 
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assumption that attention functions as a selection-for action mechanism, we suggest that preparing 
to perform the S-R task should automatically affect attentional processing, even if 1) participants 
have no history with the stimuli, 2) stimuli are not salient (i.e., will not “pop-out” because of low-
level visual features), and 3) participants do not have the goal to attend these stimuli during the 
current task. Second, we examined whether this bias would still be present if instructions did not 
specify an S-R association but an association between two stimuli (an S-S association). If attention is 
mainly a selection-for-action mechanism, one would expect that attention is not biased when stimuli 
are paired with other stimuli instead of with a specific action because learning an S-S association 
should not trigger preparatory processes for performing a response. 
In line with the procedure developed by Liefooghe et al. (2012, 2013), we asked participants 
to perform an inducer task and a diagnostic task. Participants first viewed the instructions for the 
inducer task. In Experiment 1, they were presented with four object names, the first two of which 
were target objects that were associated with a response (e.g., “balcony  press A” and “bomb  
press P”; See Figure 1 for an example). The other two object names were not paired with a response 
(control objects). Subsequently, participants performed the diagnostic task, which was a version of 
the visual probe task that required the identification of a probe (the letter E or the letter F), a task 
that is commonly assumed to measure a bias in the automatic, early allocation of attention (e.g., 
Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). The probe was preceded 
by the presentation of (irrelevant) pictures of two objects (one inducer-target object and one 
inducer-control object) that were referred to in the instructions for the inducer task. This yielded two 
types of visual probe trials: congruent trials, in which the probe appeared on the same location as a 
target object picture and incongruent trials, in which the probe appeared on the opposite location of 
a target object picture. After a number of visual probe trials, one of the two target object pictures of 
the inducer task was presented in the center of the screen, and participants were required to give 
the corresponding response. It is crucial to note that the instruction screen contained only a symbolic 
representation of the stimuli that were used in the visual probe task. This means that, in contrast to 
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the study of Downing (2000), participants did not have any previous experience with the visual 
configuration of the stimuli, excluding the possibility that selection history could affect attentional 
processing.  
In Experiment 2, the task was the same, apart from two aspects: First, in the instruction 
screen, the first two words were now paired with a color-word (e.g., “balcony blue”; “bomb 
green”). Second, at the end of each run, one of the two target object pictures appeared in either 
blue or green and participants needed to indicate whether the color was correct (i.e., in line with the 
information in the instruction screen) or not. Thus, in this experiment, stimuli were not paired with a 
specific response, which excludes the possibility that response preparation would bias attention 
toward the instructed stimuli. We expected that our findings would be in line with the idea of 
attention as a selection-for-action mechanism (e.g., Allport, 1987) in the sense that we expected an 
attentional bias for target objects when these objects were associated with a response (Experiment 
1) but not when they were associated with another stimulus (i.e., a color; Experiment 2).  
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants. We tested 46 participants who were paid 10 euro or received one course 
credit for their participation. All participants were native Dutch-speakers. The study was conducted 
in accordance with the principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. 
2.1.2. Stimuli and Materials. We selected 196 pictures of the Snodgrass and Vanderwart 
(1980) picture set to use as targets in the inducer task and as irrelevant cues in the visual probe task. 
Severens, Van Lommel, Ratinckx, and Hartsuiker (2005) performed a study in which participants were 
asked to name these images as quickly as possible. We selected only pictures for which maximally 
three different names were given, in order to avoid ambiguity. Targets in the visual probe task were 
the letter E and the letter F.  
Participants were tested in a spacious room in which four computers were set up, separated 
by partitions. One, two, three or four participants were tested during each session. They were seated 
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in front of a laptop PC with a 17 inch color monitor at a distance of approximately 45 cm. After giving 
informed consent, they performed the experiment. For stimulus presentation and response 
registration, we used the E-Prime software package (Schneider, Eschman, & Zuccolotto, 2002a, 
2002b). Responses were recorded with a standard AZERTY keyboard. 
2.1.3. Procedure. The experiment consisted of 32 runs (see Figure 1). A run started with the 
presentation of the instruction screen, on which four words were presented in Courier New 18 point 
font. The first word was paired with the instruction “press left” (the A-key) and the second word was 
paired with the instruction “press right” (the P-key). The other two words were not paired with an 
instruction. Participants continued by pressing the space bar. This was followed by the presentation 
of a 16 point fixation cross for 1000 ms. Two boxes were presented 1.4 cm above and below fixation. 
Each box was 4.8 cm high and 6 cm wide. After this, two object pictures appeared (one of a target 
object, and one of a control object), each inside one of the boxes, for 500 ms. Then, the boxes were 
blank for 30 ms, and after this the target (E or F in 18 point Courier New font) appeared either on the 
location of the target object (congruent trial) or on the opposite location (incongruent trial). The 
target remained on screen until a response was given. After an incorrect response the word “FOUT” 
(“Wrong”) appeared on the screen for 500 ms. A trial was followed by an inter-trial interval that 
lasted between 250 and 500 ms. During this interval, the fixation cross and the blank boxes remained 
present on the screen. Half of the runs consisted of 8 visual probe trials, the other half consisted of 
16 visual probe trials. After the last visual probe trial of the run, one of the two target objects was 
shown in the center of the screen until the correct response was given. After an incorrect response, 
the word “FOUT” was presented for 500 ms. The run ended with a blank screen that was presented 
between 250 and 500 ms. After completing 32 runs, participants were thanked for their 
participation. All stimuli were presented in white against a black background. The drawings were 




We excluded data of two participants. One participant made too many errors in the inducer 
task, M = .85. This deviated more than 2.5 standard deviations of the mean, M = .97, SD = .04. 
Another participant made too many errors in the visual probe task, M = .88. This deviated more than 
2.5 standard deviations of the mean, M = .95, SD = .03.  
We excluded trials for which participants gave an incorrect response on the inducer task (3% 
of the data) and excluded trials for which participants reaction times were more than 2.5 standard 
deviations slower than their mean reaction times per trial type (congruent vs. incongruent; 2% of the 
data). Our analyses of the proportion of correct responses on the visual probe task did not reveal any 
effects, F(1, 43) = 1.42, MSE= .0002477,  p= .24, η2 = .03. Accuracy was very high for both the 
congruent, M = .95, SD = .03, and the incongruent trials, M = .96, SD = .03. Our analyses of the visual 
probe reaction times, however, yielded a significant congruency effect, F(1, 43) = 13.92, MSE= 127.2, 
p < .001, η2 = .24. Participants were faster to respond on congruent trials, M = 533, SD = 92, than on 
incongruent trials, M = 542, SD = 93. 
3. Experiment 2 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants. We tested 39 participants who were paid 10 euro for their participation. 
All participants were native Dutch-speakers. The study was conducted in accordance with the 
principles expressed in the Declaration of Helsinki. 
3.1.2. Stimuli, Materials, and Procedure. We used the same stimuli and materials as in 
Experiment 1, with the exception of one picture (of a bear) that could not be used because of a 
computer error. Furthermore, in the instruction screen, words were no longer paired with a 
response, but with a color. The first word was paired with the color “blue” and the second word was 
paired with the color “green”. The visual probe trials remained exactly the same, but at the end of a 
run a picture reflecting one of the first two words appeared on the screen in either blue or green and 
participants were asked to indicate whether this was correct (i.e., in line with the instruction screen) 




We excluded trials for which participants gave a response that was more than 2.5 standard 
deviations slower than their mean reaction time per trial type (2% of the data) and trials for which 
participants gave an incorrect response on the inducer task (10% of the data). There was no effect of 
Congruency on accuracy, F < 1. Participants were very accurate on both congruent, M = .96, SD = .02, 
and incongruent, M = .95, SD = .02, trials. Our reaction time data did also not reveal a congruency 
effect, F < 1. Reaction times were equally fast on congruent, M = 535, SD = 80, and on incongruent 
trials, M = 536, SD = 77.  
4. Comparison between experiments 
The results of Experiment 1 and 2 were directly compared by performing a 2 (Congruency) by 
2 (Experiment) mixed ANOVA with repeated measures on the first factor. For the reaction times, the 
main effect of congruency was significant, F(1, 81) = 9.47, MSE = 109,  p < .01, η2 = .10. In contrast, 
the main effect of Experiment was not significant, F < 1. Overall response speed was thus comparable 
in both experiments. Importantly, the two-way interaction was significant, F(1, 81) = 6.79, MSE= 109,  
p< .05, η2 = .08. This significant interaction offers statistical support for the difference in congruency 
effects observed in Experiments 1 and 2. For the accuracy data none of the effects reached 
significance, the largest F value was observed for the two-way interaction: F(1, 81) = 2.24, MSE= 
.0002427,  p= .14, η2 = .03. 
5. Discussion 
 Our results support the hypothesis that a future action plan can automatically influence early 
attentional processes. When participants learned to associate specific stimuli with specific responses 
on the basis of instructions, their attention was biased toward these stimuli (Experiment 1). Because 
participants had no prior experience in attending to these stimuli or in executing the S-R task, this 
finding indicates that future action plans can bias one’s automatic attentional processing  even in the 
absence of a prior execution of the plans. In addition, we did not find an attentional bias toward 
stimuli that were  associated not with a response but with a specific stimulus property (i.e., color; 
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Experiment 2). This strengthens the idea that attention functions as a selection-for-action 
mechanism (Allport, 1987).   
It is important to stress that the present study goes beyond previous experiments that have 
examined the role of working memory in attention (e.g., Dowd & Mitroff, 2013; Downing, 2000; 
Downing & Dodds, 2004; Schwark, Dolgov, Sandry, & Volkman 2013; Soto et al., 2006; Soto & 
Humphreys, 2007) because we show that items held in working memory can bias attention even 
when the effects of prior exposure are ruled out. It is, however, interesting to note that our results 
seem to clash with this literature. The fact that the memory task we used in Experiment 2 did not 
affect attentional bias seems in contrast with the finding that merely holding an item in working 
memory for a subsequent memory test (e.g., Olivers et al., 2006; Soto & Humphreys, 2007) can 
modulate attention. However, it must be noted that our design differs from the previous studies in 
two important ways. First, the memory task is more complicated than a mere recognition or recall 
test: it involves the pairing of a color with a specific stimulus. Furthermore, more than one 
item/feature needed to be remembered. In the light of previous research that has shown that an 
increased working memory load attenuates the attentional bias toward to-be-remembered items 
(e.g., Downing & Dodds, 2004; Woodman & Luck, 2007), our findings are thus not so surprising.  
This makes the attentional bias toward the S-R items in Experiment 1 (in which the memory 
load was substantial) even more striking and suggest that the underlying mechanisms of this effect 
are different from those involved in the studies concerning working memory and attention we 
discussed above (e.g., Soto et al., 2009). Our findings suggest that a conceptual representation of an 
object that is related to a future action is consolidated in such a way that it can bias attention even in 
situations when working memory is burdened with different instructions, tasks, and stimuli. This is 
related to an issue brought forward by, for instance, Woodman and Luck (2007) who suggest that 
working memory and task set are two different constructs that differentially affect attentional 
processing, and supports the notion that our manipulations go beyond those used in the context of 
working memory and attention. 
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Furthermore our research provides three important additions to research on the automatic 
effects of instructions. First, a plan that is implemented on the mere basis of instructions, not only 
can lead to automatic response activations (e.g., Everaert et al., 2014), but can also bias attention 
toward the stimuli represented in that plan. While circumstantial evidence already suggested this 
possibility (Wenke et al., 2007), the present study offers clear-cut evidence that instructed S-R 
mappings can indeed affect behavior at early stages of attention allocation. Second, the present 
study offers additional insights in the nature of the S-R associations that a plan includes. The same 
concepts were instantiated in different ways in the instructions of the inducer task (object-words) 
and the cues in the visual probe task (object-pictures). Because attention was modulated across 
these different instances, instructed S-R associations most likely employ higher-order conceptual 
stimulus representations, rather than concrete representations. This conclusion converges with the 
proposals of Liefooghe et al. (2012), who suggested that instructed S-R associations only include 
conceptual response representations. Taken together, the present study and the study of Liefooghe 
et al. (2012) indicate that instructed S-R associations are most probably stripped of concrete stimulus 
and response features during the implementation of instructions. Finally, while research on 
instructions for the most part focused on instructed S-R associations, the present results offer a first 
distinction between instructed S-R associations and instructed S-S associations, with only the former 
type being able to modulate attention. Such distinction clearly calls for a systematic comparison of 
different types of instructions and the automatic effects they elicit.  
To sum up, our study shows that attention and action are indeed strongly related, but more 
importantly, our study shows that experience is an unnecessary condition for an action-induced 
attentional bias to occur. At the same time, we offer additional evidence that the automatic impact 
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